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1. Introduction1 
An international monetary regime can be defined as a set of rules and arrangements 
underpinned by expectations that provide two global public goods: international currencies 
and external stability (Bordo and Schwartz 1999, Dorrucci and McKay 2011). Its main 
function is to facilitate economic and financial integration between the nations that are part of 
the international monetary regime. Eichengreen (1996, p. 1) describes it as “the glue that 
binds national economies together.” This paper deals with how this glue has bound national 
economies together throughout the last 200 years. Specifically, we focus on the role of central 
banks in shaping the broad trends from the commodity standards of the 19th century to the 
present mixed regime of floating and managed exchange rates. This story is not easy to 
capture, partly because the law usually left no formal role for central banks in the 
determination of exchange rate regimes. They were charged with maintaining internal price 
stability, issuing currency and promoting well functioning financial and money markets, but 
the choice of regime itself tended to be statutory and political, leaving the delivery of the 
exchange rate system as an adjunct to central banks’ responsibility for domestic price 
stability. Therefore, officially, there was no major turning point in the history of the 
international monetary regime in which a central bank formally made a crucial difference. For 
example Britain’s return to the gold standard in 1819 was decided by the Parliament, and it 
was the government that suspended the gold standard in 1914. After the war, again the 
government decided to bring sterling back to the pre-war parity in 1925 and suspended the 
gold standard again in 1931. France’s decision to limit silver coinage in the 1860s was taken 
                                                 
1 University of Glasgow and University of Zurich respectively. We thank the editors and Lars Jonung for their 
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by the government, not the central bank. As in Britain, the suspension of the gold standard in 
1914, the resumption of convertibility in the 1920s and the devaluation in the 1930s were all 
government affairs. In Germany, the decision to adopt the gold standard after the Franco-
Prussian War was taken before the Reichsbank was even founded. After 1949 the Bundesbank 
retained a powerful stance in restraining domestic inflation, but the Snake, the European 
Monetary System and the Euro were the result of decisions taken by the government, in some 
cases against the advice of the Bundesbank. In the United States, the Federal Reserve was 
irrelevant when in April 1933 President Roosevelt decided to devalue the dollar. 
Subsequently, the main architect of the Bretton Woods system was Harry Dexter White of the 
Treasury, not Fed Chairman Marriner S. Eccles, and the accord was made legally effective by 
Congress. The timing of the end of the gold convertibility in August 1971 appears to have 
been mainly determined by President Nixon and his hawkish Treasury Secretary John 
Connally.  This insight emphasizes the distinction between strategic and operational 
responsibilities under the different forms of international monetary system.  While the 
strategic choice of regime may have rested with the government, the operational details and 
implementation of that decision was usually delegated to central bankers.  This enhanced their 
informal influence even where the formal legal position may have suggested that they were 
mere functionaries in the system. 
The subordinate role in choosing the exchange rate regime does not imply that central 
banks were irrelevant throughout the history of international monetary regimes. The way they 
managed the regime proved essential for international financial and monetary stability. 
Central bankers shared particular characteristics that made them the guardians of expertise 
about monetary matters. First, they often had the closest relationships with the constituents of 
the foreign exchange market in the form of banks and other financial institutions because of 
their roles as discounters and supervisors. Moreover, in most countries they were not subject 
to the political cycles of democratic regimes and so spanned government tenures in a way that 
lifted them above immediate political pressures. Being unaccountable directly to parliaments 
or voters also created opportunities for personal and private cooperation and communication, 
which facilitated their actions compared to democratically accountable politicians. In times of 
crisis, central bankers were frequently able to meet quickly and resolve obstacles 
expeditiously in ways that political actors were not able to achieve. The historical record also 
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reveals frequent episodes of conflict between central banks and governments over the priority 
of price stability over growth with attendant implications for the exchange rate regime. 
As it is nearly impossible to capture all sides of the complex interaction between central 
banks and the international monetary regime, we focus on a question that appears to be 
particularly relevant in the wake of the recent financial crisis. We ask under what historical 
circumstances central banks have been successful in preserving the two main elements of an 
international monetary regime – international currencies and external stability – over the last 
200 years. Our focus is on the history of the leading central banks in the Western Hemisphere 
since the end of the Napoleonic Wars and of the Bank of Japan since 1973. The choice is 
selective, but can be justified by the fact that these central banks were more crucial for the 
international regime and became models for the non-Western world, starting in the 19th 
century. 
The most obvious answer to our question is that much depends on the personalities who 
lead the central banks. A famous example is the history of the Federal Reserve in the interwar 
years. Benjamin Strong has been said to be an able man who died too early, while Eugene 
Meyer did not have the grandeur to deal with the extraordinary crisis of the early 1930s 
(Friedman and Schwartz 1963). We take a different approach. Our main insight is that legal 
constraints on their powers pushed central bankers into a rather weak position so that they 
have had little effective influence on the crucial factors that have determined their success in 
managing the international monetary system during most of the past 200 years. This is not to 
say that personalities have not mattered at all or that no policy mistakes were made. But as a 
rule, central bankers acted within their mandate and in accordance with a broad consensus 
when making decisions. Episodes of failure are rather mistakes than a clear sign of 
incompetence. 
The first factor that determined the influence of central banks is the type of exchange rate 
regime. Under a fixed exchange rate regime, central banks have fewer tools and a narrower 
range of operations than under a floating regime. This is particularly relevant in the event of 
severe financial crises. The second factor is central bank independence, which determines to 
what extent central banks have to be subservient to short-term domestic political interests. 
The more independent they are, the higher the probability that they can give priority to the 
international monetary regime, thus stabilizing expectations. The third factor is the degree of 
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economic policy divergence among the core countries. Capital controls may give central 
banks more time to cushion international tensions, but they do not solve underlying 
imbalances. The same is true for central bank cooperation. It can be useful to overcome 
temporary disturbances, but is to no avail if national agendas contradict the requirements of 
international stability. 
We also observe that under a fixed exchange rate regime international economic policy 
divergence is by far the most important factor determining central bank performance. 
Regardless of the degree of their independence, central bankers fail in their attempts to 
preserve international monetary stability or, still worse, reinforce the collapse of the system 
by their actions, when core countries pursue divergent economic policies. Under a floating 
exchange rate regime, by contrast, central bank independence seems to be the crucial variable. 
Equipped with full instrument independence, central banks have the power to stabilize the 
international monetary system even when national economic policies diverge. Table 1 shows 
our argument about the role of central banks in a stylized form. The interwar gold standard 
and the Bretton Woods system were not sustainable, because the leading economic powers 
pursued divergent economic policies, and the floating exchange rate regime from 1973 to 
1979 was unstable because of the lack of central bank independence to cope with the 
exogenous shocks of this era. By contrast, the classical gold standard and the floating 
exchange rate regime from 1979 to the present can be considered stable regimes, either 
because there was an international consensus (classical gold standard) or because central 
banks were independent (1979 to the present). 
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Table 1: Comparison of international monetary regimes 
 Central bank 
independence 
Economic 
policy convergence 
Fixed exchange rate regimes 
Classical gold standard + + 
Interwar gold standard + − 
Bretton Woods system − − 
Floating exchange rate regimes 
Floating exchange rate system 1973-79 − − 
Floating exchange rate system 1979 to the 
present 
+ − 
 
In the following sections, we will put more flesh on the bones of our argument. Section 2 
describes the era of the classic gold standard, which was the first international monetary 
regime where central banks played an important role. Until this time, “the banks of note 
issue” had been secondary, since the system of “international bimetallism” (Flandreau 2004) 
was decentralized and based on privately owned and transacted bullion. The classic gold 
standard was a stable regime because it combined central bank independence and economic 
policy convergence. To be sure, there were attacks on the gold standard and rudiments of 
divergence, especially in the US, but they never became strong enough to destroy the political 
and institutional foundations of the international monetary system. 
The next two sections deal with the interwar gold standard and the Bretton Woods system. 
Both systems proved inconsistent as the economic policies of the great powers diverged. The 
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degree of central bank independence varied throughout the period. It was quite high between 
the end of the First World War and the beginning of the Great Depression, while after 1945 
central banks were almost everywhere subordinated to the ministry of finance or the treasury. 
Possibly, the Fed could have done a better job in the 1930s when large parts of the banking 
system were collapsing, or it would have contained inflation in the 1960s, had it been more 
independent. Yet, as we will argue, the systemic flaws were too fundamental to be papered 
over by a different monetary policy. Central bank cooperation was reinforced, but proved 
inadequate in the wake of growing international imbalances. 
Section 5 analyses the experiences since 1973, which have been mixed. In the first period, 
lasting from 1973 to 1979 the system was unstable. Governments had abandoned fixed 
exchange rates without embracing the advantages of the floating exchange rates and giving 
central banks the mandate to curb inflation. The regime was also inconsistent as states 
wavered between ameliorating unemployment and containing inflationary expectations. 
Things changed after 1979 when the Fed, the British government and the members of the 
newly founded European Monetary System increased their determination to restrain inflation.  
The era of the Great Moderation promoted the reputation of independent central banks in 
achieving relatively full employment, sustained economic growth with price stability.  In the 
wake of the financial crisis of 2007-2009 the record looks less impressive than before 2007. 
However, we will argue that even from today’s perspective the glass is half full, not half 
empty. The chapter ends with a short conclusion. 
 
2. Central banking under the classical gold standard 
Between the end of the Napoleonic Wars (1815) and the outbreak of the First World War 
(1914) most Western countries had a fixed exchange rate regime based on a gold, silver or 
bimetallic standard. Economic historians distinguish between two eras. The first era, lasting 
from 1815 to 1873, was characterized by so-called international bimetallism, whereas the 
years between 1873 and 1914 were dominated by the classic gold standard. During the gold 
standard era, silver standards continued to exist only in China, India and some Central 
American economies, while the bimetallic standard remained only a de jure regime but was de 
facto abandoned. 
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The time between 1815 and 1914 was also the period when most industrialized countries 
set up a “banks of issue” (Table 2). The forerunners had been the Swedish Riksbank (1668), 
the Bank of England (1694) and the Banque de France (1800). An important milestone was 
the establishment of the Prussian Bank in 1847, which in 1876 was transformed into the 
Reichsbank to unify the German currency and deliver the rules of the gold standard in the 
German Empire. The State Bank of the Russian Empire was founded in 1860. The Bank of 
Japan, the first central bank outside Europe, opened in 1882, but had a rival in the Yokohama 
Specie Bank, which managed metallic reserves and international transactions. Japan only 
joined the gold standard in 1897 after a war indemnity in gold was won from the Chinese 
government. The USA lacked a central bank until 1913, which impeded the coherence of 
national monetary policy. The USA formally joined the gold standard in 1900, finally giving 
up the fight for silver based on the silver mines of Nevada. 
 
Table 2: The Origins of Central Banks* 
Year Country Name Motivation 
1668 Sweden Sveriges Riksbank Finance war 
1694 UK Bank of England Finance war 
1782 
 
Spain Banco de España Finance war 
1800 France Banque de France Manage public debt, 
generate seignorage 
1811 Finland Suomen Pankk Monetary sovereignty 
1814 Netherla
nds 
Nederlandsche Bank Promote economic growth 
1816 Austria Österreichische Nationalbank Manage public debt as a 
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result of war finance 
1816 Norway Norges Bank Economic crisis in Denmark 
prompts monetary reform 
1818 Denmark Danmarks Nationalbank Restore stability in aftermath 
of war finance 
1846 Portugal Banco de Portugal Restore credibility to 
previous monetary regime 
1847 Prussia Bank of Prussia  
1850 Belgium Banque nationale de 
Belgique/Nationale Bank van 
België 
Reform prompted by 
banking crises 
1860 Russia State Bank of the Russian 
Empire 
 
1876 Germany Reichsbank Consolidation of previous 
note issuing authorities 
following unification 
1882 Japan Bank of Japan Part of modernization of 
Meiji regime 
1893 Italy Banca d’Italia Consolidation of previous 
note issuing authorities 
following unification 
1907 Switzerla
nd 
Schweizerische 
Nationalbank/Banque nationale 
suisse 
Elimination of note issuing 
authority 
1911 Australia Commonwealth Bank of Creation of a single note 
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Australia issuing authority 
1913 USA Federal Reserve System Creation of lender of last 
resort and other banking related 
functions 
Sources: Goodhart, Capie and Schnadt (1994), Siklos (2002). 
Note: * The list is confined to central banks of today’s OECD countries. There were also 
new central banking institutions on the Netherlands Antilles (established 1828), in Indonesia 
(1828), Bulgaria (1879), Romania (1880) and Serbia (1883). 
 
Central banks did not play a vital role prior to the advent of the classical gold standard. A 
short digression into the inner workings of the international regime before 1873 is needed in 
order to understand why. The regime consisted of three different groups. Britain, the heartland 
of the industrial revolution and the rising center of the world economy, was the head of the 
gold group, in association with its dominions and colonies. Outside of the British Empire only 
Brazil, Portugal and Turkey were also on the gold standard by the mid-19th century. It is 
important to note that prior to the classical gold standard the pound sterling and the London 
market were not yet as predominant as they would be after the 1870s (Ugolini 2010).  The 
silver group was bigger, but had no strong financial center or lead central bank. It comprised 
Austria, Prussia and the other German states, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries. 
Outside of Europe, Asia was firmly on silver (China, India and Japan) while in the Americas 
only Mexico opted for this standard. The strong position of silver in Asia was a result of the 
sustained drain of American and European silver to the developed industrial centers in the Far 
East since the 16th century.  The third group was on a bimetallic standard, with France at its 
center and Belgium, Italy, and Switzerland as its associates. In the mid-1860s, the group 
formalised rules concerning the silver content of the 5-franc coin by constituting the Latin 
Monetary Union. In 1868, Greece and Spain joined. The United States was also on a 
bimetallic standard from 1792 to 1862, when in the course of the Civil War the dollar began 
to float. Contrary to the textbook predictions that bimetallism breeds instability, the early 19th 
century bimetallic standard proved robust and durable, partly through the management of 
central banks (Friedman 1990, Velde 2000, Flandreau 2002). 
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Although there were three distinct groupings, it is appropriate to speak of one regime, 
because it succeeded in providing the two essential public goods of any international 
monetary system: international currencies and external stability. From 1803, the bimetallic 
group legally stabilized the price ratio between gold and silver (1:15.5). It did so by absorbing 
the metal that was in oversupply, while releasing the other metal that was scarce. In this 
careful balancing act, the Banque de France succeeded very well and the ratio between gold 
and silver remained very stable from 1803 to the early 1870s when the system of international 
bimetallism collapsed (Friedman 1990, Flandreau 2004). In particular, the system was elastic 
enough to absorb the monetary supply shocks following the discovery of gold in Australia and 
California in the late 1840s and the discovery of Silver in Nevada in the late 1850s. But 
central banks were not essential for the operation of international bimetallism because a large 
part of the bullion stock was in private hands and payments in gold and silver were still very 
common, even across borders to offset payment imbalances between trading firms, banks and 
investors. In 1860, the Banque de France held only 14 percent of total specie supplies in 
France which made up more than three quarters of the money supply M1 (Flandreau 2004, p. 
4).  
Although they were not supporting pillars of the international monetary regime, central 
banks underwent an important transformation prior to 1873. Probably the most important 
innovation was their new role as lenders of last resort. In the first half of the 19th century even 
the most experienced institution at the time, the Bank of England, still made serious mistakes 
by rationing credit during the panic, thus magnifying negative effects. In the 1850s and 1860s, 
however, the Bank of England, the Banque de France and other central banks such as Norges 
Bank began to understand better how to deal with financial panics (Calomiris 2011, Bignon et 
al. 2012, Eitrheim et al. 2016). Bagehot’s 1873 Lombard Street provoked considerable debate 
across Europe about the role of lender of last resort and the terms and conditions under which 
central banks could lend to financial institutions.  Another important development before 
1873 was the British discussion about rules vs. discretion under a metallic standard. Important 
milestones were the bullionist debates following the suspension of convertibility in 1797, the 
controversy between the banking and the currency schools after the restoration of the gold 
standard in 1821, the Bank of Act of 1833 that made Bank of England notes legal tender, and 
the Bank Act of 1844 which gave the Bank of England the monopoly of note issue. 
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The co-existence of different metallic standards came to an end in the early 1870s. The 
crucial event was the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71. With fresh gold reserves from its war 
indemnity from France, the newly founded German Empire decided to abandon the silver 
standard in favor of the gold standard. In retaliation for German unilateralism, France reacted 
by suspending its role as moderator of the international bimetallic regime. As a result, the 
price of silver relative to gold began to decline, prompting the European silver group to adopt 
the gold standard. France and the United States, driven by the advantages of network effects, 
soon followed (Gallarotti 1995, Flandreau 1996, Meissner 2005). By the late 1870s the 
transition to a mono-metallic gold standard was completed, leaving relatively few low income 
economies such as Mexico, India and China retained the silver standard. A new era had begun 
and central banks became important in the management of the international monetary regime.  
 First and foremost, central banks managed a much larger share of gold than before 1873, 
and they acted as the institution that took responsibility for maintaining convertibility between 
gold and notes. The shift to the gold standard thus brought a nationalization and centralization 
of the international monetary regime and, based on their monopoly, central banks became 
ever more skilful in expanding their room to maneuver. Seen from today, however, they were 
not yet conducting a modern monetary policy.2 They also differed with respect to their 
mandates and instruments. The Bank of England was an exception rather than the rule in 
terms of its statutory independence and range of responsibilities. One essential difference was 
the importance of the banking business. While the Bank of England had only a few branches 
outside London and faced strong competition by private banks in London, the Banque de 
France and the Reichsbank had a dense web of subsidiaries that provided a substantial share 
of normal banking services. Another difference was the variation in gold and silver reserves. 
The Banque de France possessed a huge share of global gold reserves, providing a strong 
shield against external shocks and widening their room to maneuver, whereas the Bank of 
England had a rather small gold cushion. The Bank of England also used the discount rate as 
                                                 
2 Sayers (1976, p. 1) observes: “The term ‘central bank’ had been creeping into public discussion in the 
second half of the nineteenth century but had not yet any settled concept behind it. (…). At the end of the 
nineteenth century, however, ‘central bank’ meant scarcely more than a single bank distinguished from others 
by unique public responsibilities eclipsing its commercial interests.” 
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the main policy instrument, while the Banque de France did not (Contamin 2003, Morys 
2013). 
All in all, the core central banks succeeded in preserving stability, mainly because of the 
high degree of credibility of the monetary regime. Private-sector agents expected that central 
banks would always keep their commitment to safeguarding convertibility, except in well 
justified exceptional circumstances. This set in motion a virtuous circle between strong 
credibility and monetary autonomy in the short-run which helped run the system like a target 
zone (Bordo and Flandreau 2003, Bordo and MacDonald 2012). When the exchange rate fell 
toward the lower limit (gold point), central banks were not immediately forced to raise 
interest rates; investors drove the exchange rate back to par, expecting that the central bank 
would ultimately react. In anticipating a tightening of monetary policy, short-term capital 
movements replaced the reaction and allowed ‘automatic’ stabilisation or at least gave the 
central bank some breathing space. Of course, the principle of convertibility acted as a 
constraint. Nevertheless, the notion that monetary policy was purely on autopilot has no 
historical foundation.  
There were several opportunities for central bankers to enlarge their active management of 
the system. In good times, they increased the level of metallic and foreign exchange reserves 
well above the legal minimum in order to pursue an accommodative stance in times of crisis. 
They also used their holdings of bonds and bills to sterilize capital inflows (Øksendal 2012, 
Ögren 2012, Ugolini 2012). Another way to dampen the shocks to the financial and monetary 
system was to deploy so-called ‘gold devices’ such as delaying capital movements or to 
demand a fee to introduce further frictions into capital flows. Some central banks, especially 
the Austro-Hungarian bank, became quite skillful in using foreign exchange intervention to 
avoid interest rate spikes emanating from the Bank of England (Flandreau and Komlos, 
Jobst). The Bank of Belgium, the pioneer of foreign exchange management in the 1850s, also 
used this policy (Ugolini 2012) and it was an inspiration for the Bank of Japan. Finally, many 
peripheral countries never introduced specie convertibility (Morys 2013).3 
                                                 
3 Morys (2013, p. 221): „If peripheral countries modified the “English” gold standard to suit their needs, this 
probably entails a wider lesson for the functioning of the Classical Gold Standard. There was not only one gold 
standard but a variety of gold standards. Peripheral countries apparently followed a version different from the 
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The classic gold standard enjoyed such a high degree of credibility partly because it was 
shielded from domestic politics and partly because the core countries pursued similar 
economic policy goals. Among the core countries the level of public debt was manageable, 
the public spending ratio to GDP was below 20 percent, and wages and prices were relatively 
flexible. Furthermore, the costs of adjustment were passed on to those parts of society that had 
the least political rights (Eichengreen 1996). In the 19th century suffrage was quite limited in 
most Western countries and governments in Europe were mainly concerned with internal and 
external security and property rights. A consensus that the state was responsible for the 
economic welfare of populations had begun to develop, but was not well established until the 
end of the century. This left most monetary authorities relatively free to pursue deflationary 
policies in order to maintain a metallic standard. The combination of exchange rate stability 
and free capital movements was the chosen combination, at the expense of a fully independent 
monetary policy. 
The second factor promoting creditability was the relatively underdeveloped state of 
economic theory. True, early versions of price level targeting were developed in the beginning 
of the 19th century, and towards the end of the 19th century several economists, notably Knut 
Wicksell and Irving Fisher, devised well developed frameworks that explained the 
relationship between monetary policy and the business cycle (Laidler 1999, Burdekin et al. 
2012). They showed that the gold standard was not the best framework for monetary policy. 
But these ideas remained marginal before 1914. Accordingly, the public and voters were not 
aware of the power central banks were exerting over the business cycle. Monetary policy was 
not yet politicized. 
Thirdly, there were fewer massive exogenous shocks during the pre-1914 decades. 
Revolutions and wars as well as financial panics were frequent and serious, but not 
comparable to the First World War, the Bolshevik Revolution or the Great Depression. The 
                                                                                                                                                        
one pioneered by England. Perhaps it is precisely this institutional flexibility which explains why the Classical 
Gold Standard remains to this day the longest-ever system of fixed exchange-rates.” 
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most serious European war between 1815 and 1914 was the Franco-Prussian war of 1870/71.4 
It lasted less than one year (from July 1870, to May 1871), with Germany and France 
counting 45,000 and 139,000 dead and 90,000 and 143,000 wounded soldiers respectively. In 
comparison, during the First World War more than nine million soldiers died and about 7 
million civilians lost their lives. The revolutions of 1848 shattered existing social orders, but 
did not undermine property rights in the long run. In contrast, the Bolshevik Revolution of 
1917 eradicated the noble and bourgeois elites in Russia, socialized all means of production 
and defaulted on all external debts. The Great Depression of 1929-33 paralyzed the two 
largest economies of the world, the USA and Germany, for more than three years, with real 
GPD declining by a third and unemployment rising to more than 20 percent. The only crisis of 
the 19th century that came near the catastrophe of the 1930s was the panic of 1837 in the 
USA. And as Calomiris (2011, p. 106) argues, financial panics after 1850 were harmless 
relative to the crises in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, because banks maintained high 
equity-to-assets and liquidity ratios. 
A fourth explanation explaining the persistence of the gold standard highlights the 
importance of international emergency measures. Central banks repeatedly shipped gold or 
silver across frontiers to help contain a financial panic, especially in 1890 and 1907. The 1890 
sovereign debt crisis focused in Latin America nearly brought down the great London finance 
house of Barings (Mitchener et al., 2008, Flores 2011) and threatened to push Britain off the 
gold standard. Argentina issued bonds payable in gold or in sterling in London, but was not 
itself on a metallic standard. After investing borrowed funds in infrastructure projects, the 
government found itself unable to service these debts in an environment of inflation and a 
depreciating peso. The resolution of the crisis required emergency central bank cooperation.  
Barings was rescued by the Bank of England, which arranged gold loans from the Banque de 
France and Russia’s central bank. Likewise, in 1906-07, heavy US borrowing drained gold 
from the Bank of England, but a damaging rise in interest rates was avoided through loans 
from the Banque de France and the German Reichsbank (Toniolo 2005, p.15).  These early 
                                                 
4 The most important political events between 1815 and 1914 were: Revolutions: 1830 and 1848, wars: 
Crimean War (1853-56), US Civil War (1861-65), Austro-Prussian War (1866), Franco-Prussian War (1870-71), 
the Spanish-American War (1898), the Boer War (1899-1902), Balkan Wars (1912-13). 
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examples of central bank cooperation show how central bankers could perceive themselves as 
a collective group with common interests in preserving the stability of the international 
monetary system. 
Of course, all explanations have their weaknesses. First, even in countries with a full-
fledged democracy for male voters since 1848, as in France and Switzerland, the metallic 
standard was not challenged by the public. Second, central bankers were absolutely aware that 
raising interest rates would hurt the economy (Sayers 1957, cited by Bordo and MacDonald 
eds, p. 69; Morys 2013 cites protocols of Austria-Hungary). Third, shocks were maybe not as 
big as during the first half of the 20th century, but they had the potential to destroy the 
international monetary regime. Reinhart and Rogoff identify 24 banking crises in high and 
middle income countries during the period of high capital mobility from 1880-1914 (Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2009: 344-45).5 And fourth, the concerted interventions by central bankers were 
a response to exceptional strains rather than a key function of the everyday operation of the 
gold standard. For the most part central banks acted in their own national interest with little 
spirit of coordination for its own sake (Flandreau 1997). 
Nevertheless, despite these objections, it is clear that historical circumstances provided a 
strong basis for the credibility of the classical gold standard. Central banks were only 
successful in managing the international monetary system because the classical gold standard 
was compatible with the political environment, both domestically and internationally. This is 
not to say that there was no threat to stability (Bordo and Capie 1993, Intro, pp. 5-6; Bordo 
and Schwartz 1999, pp. 160-161; Eichengreen 1996, pp. 41-42). But it would be wrong to 
argue that the collapse of the classical gold standard was inevitable in 1914. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Major financial crises between 1815 and 1914 were: In Britain: 1825, 1836-39, 1847, 1857 and 1866 (Capie 
2009). In France: 1818, 1840, 1848 and 1851 (White 2011, p. 79). In the US, the most important financial panics 
are the following: 1819, 1837, 1857, 1873, 1884, 1893, 1896 and 1907 (Calomiris 2011, p. 104). 
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3. Central banks and the collapse of the interwar gold standard 
During the interwar years, central banks struggled to sustain the restored gold-based 
international monetary regime afloat that was reconstructed after the war. In the 1920s most 
governments pursued a concerted effort to return to ‘normal’ by restoring the gold value of 
their currencies. Starting in 1931, the gold exchange standard collapsed, and subsequently 
central banks in Britain, France, Germany and the United States lost their independence. 
However, as we will argue, their responsibility for the Great Depression has been 
overemphasized. They made mistakes, but the fundamental problem was that the international 
monetary regime was not compatible with the dynamics of both international and domestic 
politics (Ritschl and Straumann 2010). Central banks had full instrument independence, but 
centrifugal forces proved much too strong. 
Ex ante, things were not looking as bad as they did ex post. The postwar stabilization after 
1918 was a direct consequence of the contingent gold standard rules and resembled what 
happened after the Napoleonic Wars and the American Civil War. The debate after 1918 
echoed in many ways the Bullionist debate more than a hundred years earlier, when English 
politicians, bankers and economists debated the pros and cons of convertibility. But there was 
an important difference to earlier periods. The inter-war gold standard was the result of 
repeated international conferences that brought government officials and central bank 
governors together to discuss the redesign of the international monetary system. The delegates 
at the Genoa International Economic Conference in 1922 explicitly recommended that central 
bank cooperation was a vital aspect of a prospective new gold standard and that this should be 
institutionalized in a convention or ‘entente’.6 This new focus on central bank independence 
and cooperation to manage the international monetary system particularly reflected the views 
of the Governor of the Bank of England Montagu Norman, and the Benjamin Strong, first 
Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank, who together promoted close relations and 
cooperation. In Britain, Norman joined with the UK Treasury to push the inexperienced 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Winston Churchill to return speedily to the gold standard in 
                                                 
6 Papers relating to International Economic Conference, Genoa, April-May 1922, London: HMSO, p. 60. 
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1925 (Boyce, 2005; 222-23). The enhanced prominence of these key central bankers helped to 
promote the role of central banks in the global system. 
The interwar gold exchange standard launched a new era of central banking outside 
Europe. The First World War prompted a surge of state-building that included a desire to have 
national central banks as part of the apparatus of independent policy-making. Central banks 
were also an important tool to operate the inter-war gold exchange standard. Governor 
Montagu Norman of the Bank of England promoted a network of central banks modeled on 
the Bank of England that could cooperate to deliver ‘orthodox’ policies aimed at monetary 
and exchange rate stability. His vision was supported by the Financial Committee of the 
League of Nations, which sent missions to a range of central European states in the mid-1920s 
as part of the general spirit of creating a coordinated international monetary system. Sir Otto 
Niemeyer and other officials from the Bank of England toured a range of emerging markets to 
advise on monetary policy, ‘sound money’ and to promote the establishment or reform of 
independent central banks. His advice was sometimes controversial, for example, in Australia 
where his recommendations of austerity to restore exchange rate stability and to allow the 
national debt to be serviced were greeted with indignation (Attard, 1992; 82). Many Western 
Hemisphere states looked to the USA and Edwin Kemmerer of the Federal Reserve Bank 
toured a range of countries from 1917-1931 advising on the organization of central banks, 
including Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru (Singleton, 2011; 60).  Table 3 shows a 
range of central banks designed by the League of Nations and Bank of England advisers. In 
the end, these central banks lasted much longer than the international monetary system that 
they were designed to deliver.   
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Table 3:  Central Banks and International Missions in the Inter-war Period 
Countries Year Mission Outcome 
South Africa 1920 Sir Harry 
Strakosch 
South African Reserve Bank 
Austria 1923 League of 
Nations 
Austrian National Bank 
Poland 1923 League of 
Nations 
Reorganised National Bank into 
central bank 
Free State of 
Danzig 
1923 League of 
Nations 
Bank of Danzig 
Hungary 1924 League of 
Nations 
National Bank reorganized into 
central bank 
Czechoslovakia 1926 League of 
Nations 
National Bank of 
Czechoslovakia 
Estonia 1927 League of 
Nations 
National Bank reorganized into 
central bank 
Bulgaria 1928 League of 
Nations 
National Bank reorganized into 
central bank 
Greece 1928 League of 
Nations 
Central Bank of Greece 
Australia 1930 Sir Otto 
Niemeyer 
Commonwealth Bank 
reorganized into central bank? 
New Zealand 1930 Sir Otto Central Reserve Bank of NZ 
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Niemeyer 1934 
Brazil 1931 Sir Otto 
Niemeyer 
Bank of Brazil reorganized into 
central bank 
Canada 1933 Lord Macmillan, 
Sir Charles Addis 
Bank of Canada 
India 1933 Sir Ernest 
Harvey, W.H. Clegg 
Central Reserve Bank of India 
El Salvador 1934 F.F.J. Powell Central Reserve Bank of El 
Salvador 
Argentina 1935 Sir Otto 
Niemeyer 
Central Bank of Argentine 
China 1935 Sir Frederick 
Leith-Ross 
Currency reform: sterling/dollar 
peg 
Egypt 1936 Sir Otto 
Niemeyer 
National Bank of Egypt 
reorganized into central bank 
 
 The restored international monetary system was a haphazard inconsistent adoption of a 
pegged gold exchange standard, which relied more on sterling and other national currencies as 
foreign exchange reserves. Exchange rates tended to reflect political targets rather than 
economic realities.  Thus, sterling and the lira were pegged at their pre-war parities despite 
significant changes in their global economic standing. The French franc was stabilized at a 
greatly devalued rate compared to 1900, prompting inflationary pressures and the 
accumulation of reserves. Politics over-rode economic reality and central bankers who were 
left managing the system were unable to fend off market pressures that led ultimately to a 
global banking and financial crisis in 1931, ironically just after the founding of the Bank for 
International Settlements seemed to be fulfilling the central bank association that was the 
‘dream of Genoa’ (Toniolo, 2005; p. 20 quoting Bank of England’s Charles Addis in 1929). 
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When the cost of maintaining the international system became too high in the contagious 
financial crisis of the 1930s, the mood shifted radically and states abandoned the struggle to 
fight the market and suspended the gold standard. The international system was swiftly 
fragmented into currency and trade blocs. The interwar gold standard failed to provide the two 
global public goods in times of crises: international currencies and external stability. In 1931 
there was a shortage of liquidity, and currencies tumbled the gold standard one after another. 
Germany introduced capital controls in the summer of 1931, and Britain took sterling off gold 
in the autumn of the same year. The US followed in the spring of 1933, France in the fall of 
1936.  The experiment with a deliberately constructed specie based system had failed. 
Why were central banks not able to prevent the regime from collapsing? They certainly 
made several mistakes, not only from today’s perspective, but also in the eyes of critical 
contemporaries such as Fisher or Keynes. Especially the Fed could have done more to contain 
the banking panics of the 1930s. Instead of pursuing an expansionary monetary policy to 
stabilise the money supply, it concentrated on keeping the monetary base constant (Friedman 
and Schwartz 1963, Meltzer 2003). Admittedly, the US banking system was particularly weak 
due to the high share of unit banking, but there is no doubt that the Fed could have done more 
to mitigate the negative macroeconomic consequences of the banking crises in the early 1930s 
(Carlson and Mitchener 2009, Calomiris 2011).  Certainly central banks bore some of the 
responsibility. 
Yet, it would be too easy to put all the blame on the shoulders of central bankers. In the 
USA the Fed was arguably following one of its main rules, namely to preserve convertibility. 
In Germany, Hans Luther was perhaps not the best central banker in German history, but he 
had little room to maneuver once a run on the German currency developed in the challenging 
political and economic climate (James 2013, p. 125). Open credit lines provided by France, 
the UK or the US may have made a crucial difference, but central bankers were inhibited by 
political obstacles from offering substantial credits to Germany. And once the German crisis 
escalated, sterling quickly followed, pushed on my domestic political stalemate over 
government spending and taxation that undermined credibility in the ability of politicians to 
restore prosperity. The combination of an overvalued currency, the political costs of austerity, 
and a drain of foreign reserves as a result of the international liquidity crisis forced the 
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government to suspend the gold standard in September 1931. From then, it was only a matter 
of time until the US and France devalued their currencies as well. 
Furthermore, not only central bankers, but most politicians were in favor of prioritising 
nominal exchange rate stability. Even after the suspension of the gold standard the authorities 
remained conservative with respect to any regime change and their preference was usually in 
favour of stable or pegged exchange rates. During the inter-war economic crisis, centre-right 
politicians as well as Social Democrats and trade union officials were reluctant to abandon the 
gold standard, even though the monetary straitjacket reinforced the slump (Eichengreen and 
Temin 2000). The most notorious example is the slow dissolution of the Gold Bloc in the 
1930s. Most independent observers predicted that it was a futile exercise to maintain the 
existing parity after the UK and the US left the gold standard in September 1931 and April 
1933 respectively. But France together with Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and 
Switzerland defended their deflationary policies within a Gold Bloc until the domestic 
political support had crumbled in the mid 1930s (Feinstein, Temin and Toniolo 1997). Even 
after the interwar gold standard collapsed in the 1930s, both governments and central banks in 
many countries aimed to minimise exchange rate fluctuations because floating was believed 
to introduce uncertainty and transactions costs harmful to trade. In June 1933 the Bank of 
England, Banque de France and the Fed agreed to try to stabilize the gold price of their 
currencies but they were over-ridden by President Roosevelt’s desire to retain domestic 
monetary policy sovereignty (Feinstein, Temin, Toniolo, 2008). From 1933, therefore, the 
international monetary system came to look more like a prototype of the Bretton Woods 
system than a system of freely floating exchange rates. Sterling broke the peg to gold in 
September 1931, but most of Britain’s main suppliers of food and raw materials retained their 
peg to sterling as part of the sterling bloc. Only in Sweden was there serious consideration of 
abandon the peg for price level targeting, but the Riksbank was very reluctant to adopt the 
proposals made by Swedish economists (Berg and Jonung 1999, Straumann and Woitek 
2009). 
In the inter-war period, central bankers no doubt made monumental mistakes in policy that 
aggravated the Great Depression, but they were operating in difficult circumstances. They 
were responsible for maintaining the international monetary system, while governments failed 
to address the roots of imbalances, namely the conflict between the former war powers and 
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domestic instability. There were many reasons for why the political environment had changed 
relative to the era of the classical gold standard. By 1920, universal suffrage had become the 
norm in Western countries and the trauma of the First World War altered expectations about 
the responsibilities of the state for welfare.  At the same time greater fiscal debt and price 
instability strengthened the reorientation towards domestic policy goals and the importance of 
monetary policy sovereignty. The Allied powers had different interests with respect to 
German reparations, with the US reluctant to adopt the role of the leader (Kindleberger 1973). 
Faced with these severe contradictions, central banks failed to stabilize the international 
monetary regime, but this was likely an impossible task.  In the process several lessons were 
learned about the need for greater coordination that influenced the post-WWII settlement. 
 
4. Central bank cooperation and the end of the Bretton Woods system 
Immediately after the Second World War, central bankers were not central to the design 
and strategic management of the international monetary system, although they retained 
operational responsibilities. As the Bretton Woods system evolved, central bankers devised 
ways to cooperate in order to overcome weaknesses in the pegged exchange rate system, thus 
gaining back some of the lost ground. By the end of the 1960s, however, international 
imbalances had become too large to be ameliorated by central bank cooperation. Once more, 
central banks faced increasingly powerful diverging national interests among governments 
that meant that the international monetary regime had become incompatible with the political 
environment. 
With hindsight, it is hard to understand why after 1945 the world went back to a system of 
fixed exchange rates. Similar to the period after the disastrous conflict of 1914-1918, there 
was a broad consensus that stable exchange rates offered the best prospect for global 
recovery. The damaging political as well as economic effects of the apparent ‘currency wars’ 
of the 1930s prompted a return to the doctrine of stable exchange rates after the interregnum 
of the Second World War. The Bretton Woods system was based on a consensus built during 
the war that international capital markets were dangerous to orderly global integration, that 
international trade liberalization was the primary means to ensure sustained economic growth 
and that stable exchange rates encouraged economic cooperation and reduced transactions 
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costs (Schenk, 2010; Chwieroth, 2010). Importantly, the blueprint for Bretton Woods was not 
led by central banks but by Treasury officials in the UK (John Maynard Keynes) and USA 
(Harry Dexter White). This reflects the heightened political atmosphere in which the two 
main allied nations developed their plans for the postwar monetary system. The failure of 
economic cooperation and coordination in the interwar period and the damaging flows of hot 
money that characterized the European financial crisis of 1931 were to be avoided through a 
managed stable exchange rate with convertibility of currencies for current account purposes 
but a sustained reliance on capital controls to protect national monetary independence. 
Rather than focusing on the mainly self-interested actions of national central banks 
established during the gold standard eras, this new system created a distinctive specialist 
international monetary institution to monitor stable exchange rates. The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) was designed to provide the international economic cooperation that 
was essential to a lasting world peace, in contrast to US isolationism and European economic 
nationalism of the 1930s.  Central bankers were excluded from the formal governance of the 
system, which was led by the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund – itself 
made up of nominees from among state bureaucracies. But, as we shall see, the flaws in the 
system led to a new role for the Bank for International Settlements to provide supporting 
apparatus that drew central bankers back to the core of the international monetary system. 
Formally, all core countries were part of the system between 1947 and 1973; only Canada 
in the 1950s really experimented with a floating exchange rate at this time, although the 
commitment to a free float is debated (Siklos 2009; Helleiner 2005). But while the Bretton 
Woods regime may have been based on a common set of rules, there was hardly any year in 
which these rules were followed by all major members. There were frequent adjustments in 
the values of international currencies against the dollar that undermined the credibility of the 
system (e.g. devaluation of all European currencies 1949, DM revaluation 1961, sterling 
devaluation 1967, franc devaluation 1969, DM float 1969).  Within the Bretton Woods 
regime, regional or currency-based systems emerged as it became clear that the 
comprehensive international payments system based on convertible currencies would be 
delayed indeterminately. Among European states the European Payments Union provided a 
clearing system based on gold and dollars from 1950-1958 that facilitated a form of 
convertibility of European currencies. Current account convertibility, the cornerstone of the 
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original Bretton Woods framework of multilateralism, was only achieved at the end of 1958 
for most European currencies (Kaplan and Schleiminger, 1989). 
At the same time, the UK was the centre of the sterling area group of countries from 1945-
1972, which pooled their foreign exchange reserves at the Bank of England and operated 
exchange controls against the dollar in return for freer access to the London capital market 
(Schenk, 2010).  These countries included major primary product producers such as Australia, 
New Zealand and South Africa as well as oil producers in the Middle East such as Kuwait, 
Iraq and Persian Gulf States. British colonies such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, 
Nigeria and Ghana, Kenya and Tanganyika operated currency boards linked to sterling.  
French colonies and former colonies in Africa operated currency boards based on the franc 
and formed the Franc Area.  The Bank of England had as its primary responsibility the 
maintenance of the pegged exchange rate and the management of the foreign exchange 
reserves. 
Controlled capital markets and pegged exchange rates focused attention on defending 
balance of payments equilibrium during the building of comprehensive welfare states in many 
European countries and the liberalization of trade flows. Germany’s interwar experience of 
hyperinflation meant that the Bundesbank was particularly averse to inflation and pressed its 
influence over the government to restrain any risk to price stability. At the same time the 
Bundesbank vigorously resisted adjusting the DM exchange rate to combat inflationary 
pressure, seeking instead to put pressure on domestic economic policy, but it was over-ruled 
by the West German government in the early 1960s (Neumann, 1999: 297-8). The Bank of 
England was also wedded to the importance of a stable exchange rate as the foundation of the 
international financial leadership of the City of London as well as a constraint on successive 
government’s tendency toward inflationary growth policy. This led to a series of sometimes 
heated battles between the Bank of England and the government (Schenk, 2004).  Central 
bankers tended to be strong advocates of exchange rate stability both because they believed 
this led to more orderly international markets and because fixed rates exercised discipline 
over government economic policy. 
Flaws in the operation of the IMF created opportunities for central bankers to reassert their 
influence over the governance of the international monetary system. It took much longer to 
establish the conditions for freeing up exchange controls than had been anticipated at the 
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Bretton Woods conference in 1944. Current account convertibility was generally delayed for 
12 years beyond the inauguration of the IMF, so the system of multilateral payments designed 
at Bretton Woods could not come into practice. Borrowing from the IMF was also restrained 
initially by the alternative flow of Marshall Aid from 1947 and then by uncertainty about the 
conditionality that might be imposed on the economic policy of debtor governments. The IMF 
Executive Board and staff became a large bureaucratic organization focused on annual 
inspections of each member country’s exchange controls and lacked the spontaneity and 
flexibility to deal with the periodic crises that threatened the pegged exchange rate regime. 
Meanwhile, G10 central bank governors met monthly at the Bank for International 
Settlements in Basel Switzerland to discuss issues of mutual interest informally. This 
provided an alternative forum for the exchange of information about foreign exchange market 
intervention and coordinated support among central banks (Toniolo, 2005; Schenk 2010). 
Without being exposed to public scrutiny in their discussions or publicity for their operations, 
the Board of Governors of G10 (plus Switzerland) central banks were able to respond more 
nimbly to strains in the system.7 There were two main routes through which the central 
bankers at Basel co-operated; lines of credit and the Gold Pool. 
In March 1961, when the fixed US$ gold price of $35/oz came under pressure, the Federal 
Reserve Bank benefited from bilateral loans and sales of gold organized through the BIS. 
Three months later a more concerted line of credit (peaking at $904 million) was offered to 
support the Sterling exchange rate and a second support scheme was organized in the summer 
of 1963 ($250 million) (Toniolo, 2005; 382-3). The subsequent easing of market pressure and 
quick repayment of the arrangements persuaded central bankers that through concerted 
cooperation they could defend the international monetary system from attack by speculators.  
Sterling was a particular beneficiary of these schemes (Schenk 2010), but other currencies 
including the Lira (1964) were also supported through successive lines of credit organized 
quickly (sometimes overnight by telephone) among central bankers. In addition, and 
sometimes in concert, the US Federal Reserve engaged in substantial bilateral swaps with a 
range of central banks in Europe and beyond to provide extra liquidity, beginning in 1962 
with a $50 million swap line with the Banque de France. By 1978 the Fed’s swap network had 
                                                 
7 Countries included Sweden, UK, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, USA, Canada, Japan 
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grown to a total of $30 billion (Toniolo, 2005; 387). What is particularly important about 
these networks of cooperation to support the international monetary system is that they did 
not require parliamentary approval and were not always made public in the way that inter-
governmental loans were required to be. 
     As the international monetary system came under increasing pressure, the focus of 
attack was on sterling and the arrangements to support that currency were enhanced (Schenk, 
2010; Ch.8). In June 1966 the Bank of England negotiated a ‘Group Arrangement’ of swap 
credits for up to $600 million from other G10 central banks at Basel.  The facility was under-
used and easily renewed in March 1967. But this time the entire amount was drawn in the 
crisis that preceded the devaluation of sterling in November 1967. A second ‘Group 
Arrangement’ in 1968 (known as the Basel Agreement) became much more public and the 
terms of the credit were more onerous. This time, the Bank of England’s creditor central 
banks required the British government to negotiate agreements with major sterling holders to 
maintain the ratio of sterling in their reserves. This could only be achieved through a 
guarantee of the dollar value of these reserves. An elaborate network of 34 bilateral Sterling 
Agreements was quickly concluded in order for the Bank of England to claim the $2 billion 
line of credit. Although at its height the British drawing was only $600 million, the 
psychological effect of this cushion of credit was believed to have quietened the market and 
restored credibility to the sterling exchange rate until the summer of 1972. While central 
banks did not have a statutory role in the operations and support for the international 
monetary system, it was clear that they established institutional frameworks that allowed it to 
survive through the 1960s. 
     The second major effort of coordination among G10 central banks was initiated by the 
IMF and government Treasuries. Concerned about the diverging market price of gold from 
the fixed price, the British and American governments developed a plan in 1961 for G10 
central banks to cooperate to stabilize the London gold market. Toniolo (2005; 375-81) relates 
how central bankers were initially reluctant to engage in ‘fixing’ the market, but were 
eventually persuaded by the Americans, who arguably had the most to lose from a break in 
the gold value of the dollar. Each participating central bank earmarked an agreed amount of 
gold to be used by the Bank of England to intervene in the London market. In the first few 
years the scheme worked fairly well and deals were modest, but as confidence in the US 
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dollar waned after the devaluation of sterling in November 1967, sales of gold escalated and 
the pool suspended operations in March 1968. Thereafter, the market price of gold was 
allowed to diverge from the fixed $35/oz and the underpinning of the Bretton Woods system 
was fatally weakened. 
Central bankers’ various schemes to prop up the Bretton Woods pegged exchange rate 
system ultimately failed. In the early 1970s, under Chairman Arthur Burns, the US Fed 
persisted with expansionary monetary policy to counteract unemployment, increasing the 
pressure on the balance of payments and exposing the divergence of internal and external 
stability (Meltzer).  During the early months of 1971, the US President Nixon and his 
Secretary of the Treasury John Connally came to view the support of the dollar price of gold 
as an unbearable burden on the American economy (Schenk 2010). The so-called Nixon 
Shock of August 1971 suspended the convertibility of the US dollar to gold and threatened 
import surcharges if surplus countries did not revalue their currencies.  Despite this dramatic 
departure from the Bretton Woods system, the renewed commitment to adjusted pegged 
exchange rates through the Smithsonian Agreement in December of 1971 demonstrates the 
tenacity with which governments of the G10 sought to avoid floating exchange rates. Within 
six months, however, the markets had tested the credibility of the new parities. From August 
to December 1971, despite the growing consensus among professional economists, policy-
makers and central bankers clung to the pegged exchange rate regime, going through 
considerable contortions to replace it at different exchange rates under the Smithsonian 
Agreement. This patch on the system was short-lived with the float of sterling in June 1972 
and of European currencies and the Yen in February/March 1973. Even the float of sterling 
was only meant to be temporary until a (defendable) new equilibrium rate could be found; it 
was chosen because the government did not think that another pegged rate would be credible 
(Schenk 2010).  The members of the IMF only formally embraced the new mixture of floating 
and managed exchange rates system in 1976. 
Once again, the system had proved incompatible with the political environment. In the late 
1960s the postwar social and political consensus came to an end in many countries, not only 
on the university campuses, but also in the wage agreements between employers and workers. 
Expansionary monetary policies and the lack of wage restraint reinforced each other and 
resulted in higher inflation expectations, thus bringing instability and a loss of confidence in 
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the dollar.  One major destabilizing political factor was the escalation of the war in Vietnam 
which lessened the US government’s commitment to price stability.  With divergent national 
economic policy priorities and goals, the float of most core currencies against the dollar 
ushered in a decade of instability punctuated by commodity and asset price shocks through 
the 1970s. 
5. The shift to floating exchange rates and the rise of central banks 
The end of the Bretton Woods system ushered in a new era in the history of the 
international monetary regime. Its main feature has been the mixture of floating and managed 
exchange rates. Many countries, notably the USA, the UK and Japan, abandoned their fixed 
exchange rate regime in 1973 and since then have aimed at stabilizing domestic inflation. By 
contrast, France, Germany and most other members of the European Union have delegated 
their monetary sovereignty to the European Central Bank (ECB), while the euro itself is a 
floating currency. Many countries in East Asia, most notably China, have tried to keep their 
exchange rate stable against the dollar to foster export-led growth and have accumulated 
foreign exchange reserves as insurance against future crises. Still others have alternated 
between floating and pegged exchange rate regimes (Klein and Shambaugh 2010). 
The post-1973 international monetary regime is perhaps best characterized as a dollar 
standard, because the US currency has remained the dominant unit of account, the preferred 
means of settlement and the most popular reserve currency. The Euro has not become a 
serious challenge to the dollar yet. The institutional foundation for the single European 
currency remains incomplete and remains a threat to international monetary stability for the 
time being. The euro crisis of 2010 revealed the fragility of the system and the asymmetric 
effects to which a collection of diverse states in a single monetary union are prone. It has 
required considerable political will to overcome the crisis and ensure that the single currency 
solution continued. Eurosystem members have created a rescue fund (European Stability 
Mechanism) and have laid the basis for a banking union. But the architecture is still fragile. In 
order to become a serious alternative to the dollar, the euro needs to have more integrated 
financial markets, fiscal policy coordination and more flexibility of factor markets.  
In more recent times, the Chinese Renminbi has been identified as a potential new rival for 
the dollar. But, as with the euro, it seems premature to predict its imminent supremacy since 
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this would require the Chinese government to liberalize the capital account, which entails 
financial and political risks. Therefore the Chinese authorities have chosen a stepwise 
approach by establishing off-shore trading platforms and enhancing bilateral trade payments 
using the Chinese currency while preserving capital controls to insulate the domestic 
monetary and financial system from external shocks. Meanwhile the People’s Bank of China 
has grappled with intense domestic monetary strains posed partly by its pegged rate policy 
during the 2000s when enormous balance of payments surpluses threatened price stability 
through internal and external capital controls. Thus, despite the seismic shocks to the global 
financial system, the ascendency of the dollar persisted. 
The dollar standard went through two distinctive phases. The first phase, lasting from 1973 
to 1979, was characterized by a high degree of instability. Inflation rates within the core 
diverged considerably; West Germany and Japan restoring price stability after the first oil 
shock, while France, the UK and the USA gave priority to full employment over price 
stability. As a result, exchange rates became very volatile. Outside the G7, other groups of 
countries were set adrift by the float of the dollar in the 1970s, prompting a more stratified 
global system.8 Developing economies faced particular obstacles to adopting floating 
exchange rates with relatively thin local foreign exchange markets and vulnerability to 
seasonal instability due to dependence on primary product production. Also, the ‘seal of 
approval’ (Bordo and Rockoff 1996) identified for peripheral states in the classic 19th century 
that enhanced their ability to borrow in global capital markets appeared to persist for 
emerging and developing economies a century later. As a result, many countries continued to 
peg their exchange rates to the dollar as a commitment mechanism. When pegging to a 
depreciating dollar became uncomfortable in the inflationary era of the 1970s, some opted for 
adjustable pegs or pegged to trade weighted baskets (Schenk and Singleton, 2014). 
The second phase started in the late 1970s when the USA, the UK and a series of other 
OECD countries began to rein in inflation regardless of the short-term cost to employment. As 
a result, exchange rate volatility decreased, and the international monetary system gained in 
stability. The era of the Great Moderation from the 1980s to 2008 achieved consistently low 
                                                 
8 G7 included USA, Japan, Canada, UK, Germany, France, Italy. 
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inflation rates in most of the industrialized world and the financial and currency crises that 
punctuated this stability had mainly regional effects, although these were at times severe. The 
success of macroeconomic policies in the 1980s encouraged the member states of the 
European Economic Community (EEC) – since 1992 the European Union (EU) – to move 
inexorably toward monetary union by introducing the euro in 1999 (Mourlon-Druol, 2012). 
During the 1990s, a consensus emerged that countries should adopt either a ‘hard peg’ that 
had strong credibility through a currency board of currency substitution, or they should freely 
float their exchange rate (Mussa et al. 2000; Fischer, 2001). This bi-polar view reflected the 
repeated failures to defend pegged rates against market attack and the mixed record of 
experiments with sterilized intervention in foreign exchange markets. Direct operations by 
central banks in the foreign exchange market alone seemed to have at best short term effects; 
to be more effective they required buttressing monetary policies. In the same period, however, 
financial and currency crises in emerging markets stretching from Mexico in 1994 to the 
Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, the Rouble crisis of 1999 and the Argentinian crisis of 2002 
pushed most of these countries to resort to floating exchange rates. In particular, the collapse 
of Argentina’s currency board cast doubt on the bipolar solution. Indeed, the IMF argued in 
2011 that emerging markets with pegged exchange rates were more vulnerable to currency 
and financial crises. With little theoretical support for intermediate regimes, emerging market 
economies were urged to follow the USA in a free float, but most exhibited a so-called ‘fear 
of floating’ (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). While many claimed to float, in fact the incidence of 
intervention and capital control was more prevalent in practice (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004).  
Meanwhile, wide fluctuations in exchange rates among core countries such as the USA, Japan 
and Europe threatened to have damaging consequences for smaller countries. 
Among emerging markets, the share of countries that have a pegged or a managed floating 
exchange rate is still far higher than the share of countries with a freely floating exchange 
rate. According to the IMF de facto classification for the year 2007, 98 had a pegged 
exchange rate9, 4 a crawling peg, 56 a floating exchange rate, and only 16 a freely floating 
exchange rate (Table 4). By 2009 the IMF analysis based on de facto regimes (rather than de 
                                                 
9 Including regional agreements like the West African Economic and Monetary Union. 
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jure) determined that economies with a formal pegged rate regime had a better record for 
inflation. But growth performance was better with an intermediate system, for example by not 
adopting a strict bilateral peg to another currency. 
Table 4: IMF de facto classification of exchange rate regimes for emerging markets for 
the year (Source IMF 2009) 
Emerging markets with 
freely floating exchange 
rate 
 
Emerging markets 
with Managed floating 
exchange rate 
 
Emerging markets with 
pegged exchange rate 
 
Brazil Columbia Hungary 
Chile Peru Qatar 
Korea Czech Republic United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
Mexico Egypt China 
Philippines Russia  
Poland India  
South Africa Indonesia  
Turkey Malaysia  
 Thailand  
 Malaysia  
Note: no classification for Taiwan. 
 
Some scholars have interpreted the persistence of stable exchange rates among emerging 
markets as a sign of a revived Bretton Woods system (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber 
2004). The accumulation of dollar reserves among Asian countries as a result of undervalued 
32 
 
pegs against a depreciating dollar since 2000 is compared to the similar surpluses 
accumulated by rapidly growing Japanese and West German economies in the 1960s.  Due to 
cheap imports from Asia, inflationary pressure in the US has declined, leading the Fed to keep 
real interest rates at a historic low. Asian central banks suffer from the low US yields, but are 
willing to accept them as long as the growth strategy is seen as vital for political and social 
stability. Whether this mutual dependence between Asia and the US justifies speaking of a 
revived Bretton Woods system, is open to debate. But the behavior of Asian countries 
strongly confirms the impression that the dollar standard can be considered an international 
monetary regime from 1980, based on structural relations, rather than a ‘non-system’ of 
exchange rate regimes. 
What role have central banks played in this new international monetary system? As for the 
period between 1973 and 1979, most of them either proved helpless in containing price and 
exchange rate volatility or at worst reinforced the fragility of the system. Lacking statutory 
independence (except in a few countries like Western Germany and Switzerland) they were 
subject to the political business cycle which resulted into high and persistent inflation. In 
particular, the Fed focused almost exclusively on domestic issues, causing frequent plunges 
and reversals in the real value of the dollar that increased the fragility of the international 
financial system. Overall, the 1970s were one of the low points in the history of modern 
central banking. The combination of political dependence and international policy divergence 
made it impossible for them to stabilize the monetary system. 
Towards the end of the decade the situation began to change. The successful reduction of 
inflation in the mid-1970s by the Bundesbank and the Swiss National Bank became the 
template for other countries to restore price stability (Bernanke et al. 1999). In this process 
central banks seized the moment to reaffirm their position vis-a-vis their governments. 
Notably, the Fed experienced a comeback under Paul Volcker (formerly Under Secretary of 
the Treasury for Monetary Affairs) who used his tenure as chairman to operate an aggressive 
monetary policy that successfully cut inflation in the USA and contributed to wider systemic 
stability. His determined and successful actions also strengthened the independent status of 
the central bank. Alan Greenspan, Volcker’s successor from 1987, allowed real interest rates 
to decline further in an environment of stable inflation and reduced business cycle volatility. 
When Greenspan’s successor Ben Bernanke took office in February of 2006, he was quickly 
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confronted with the global financial crisis of 2007-09 and its repercussions. The Fed provided 
a range of lifelines to prevent the financial system from collapsing, pushed the federal funds 
rate to the zero lower bound, and initiated several rounds of quantitative easing. So far, it has 
been successful in preventing a severe depression coupled with deflation. And most 
importantly, central bank independence, though questioned by some members of Congress, is 
still in place.  
The reemphasis on domestic policy goals and the abandonment of managed exchange rates 
marked a turning point for relations between central banks and governments in all core 
countries (Cukierman 1992). The move to inflation targeting in the early 1990s reinforced the 
trend for central banks to become legally independent from the government. This institutional 
innovation shields them from domestic political concerns and aims to promote longer term 
focus on stable prices (Berger et al. 2002). In a more flexible exchange rate regime, central 
banks in the main industrialized countries have thus enhanced their independent influence 
over markets. At the same time, however, their role in the international monetary system has 
been marginalized as their range of policy targets has been reduced. Nevertheless, a keen 
awareness of the interdependence of national economic policies means that institutional 
independence from their national governments has not resulted in an absence of international 
cooperation among central bankers. The backbone of central bank cooperation has continued 
to be the Board of Governors of the BIS. It has served as the major institutional forum for 
central banks to develop relationships which allow a coordinated response to changes in the 
international monetary system and has adapted to the shifting complexion of international 
economic relations. With the rise of emerging market economies such as China, Brazil and 
Russia as important players, the BIS Board of Directors was expanded to 21 members in 
2005. Among the original members  the central bank Governors of Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, the UK and the US (plus an extra representative from each of these countries) 
continue to have a seat, but they are joined by an additional 9 elected governors of other 
central banks. This expansion makes the organization more representative, but it has also 
altered the practical nature of the meetings, the informality and traditions of the cooperative 
structures in place since the financial crisis of 1931. 
Other multilateral and bilateral cooperative institutions for central banking operate 
alongside the BIS. Bilateral cooperation through central bank swaps continues to be an 
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important element of the management of the international monetary system. For example in 
December 2007 the Federal Reserve authorized bilateral swap facilities with 14 central banks 
to sustain liquidity when there were strains in global short term dollar funding markets. The 
dollar swap lines were predominantly used by the ECB, Swiss National Bank and the Bank of 
England in 2008-9.10 In a multilateral forum, central bank governors meet alongside finance 
ministerse at the regular G7 summits that began in the late 1970s, prompted by a desire to 
moderate ‘excessive’ volatility and ‘disorderly’ exchange rates that were blamed for ‘adverse 
implications for economic and financial stability’. At each summit the participants reassert 
their commitment to market determined exchange rates but also signal their determination to 
‘cooperate as appropriate’.11 Central bank governors are also sometimes named as alternate 
representatives at the IMF Board of Governors (Bodea and Huemer, 2010). But the 
effectiveness of central bank operations in stabilizing exchange rate dynamics has been 
controversial. 
Many countries also choose to intervene in exchange markets from time to time to stabilize 
nominal rates and central banks have an operational role in this task. Mostly, the intervention 
is sterilized to insulate the domestic monetary base and a consensus emerged in the 1990s that 
such sterilized intervention was generally ineffective, although there have been exceptions 
where the market accepted that the interventions signaled future changes in economic policy 
and fundamentals. After a substantial appreciation of the US dollar against the DM in 1984, 
for example, there was a coordinated intervention by the Bundesbank, the Federal Reserve 
System and the Bank of Japan in early 1985. This was followed by a series of large and well 
publicized interventions in the late 1980s and early 1990s by G5 central banks to moderate 
fluctuations of the core industrialised countries’ currencies as part of the Plaza Agreement of 
1985 and the Louvre Accord of 1987 (Dominguez, 1998; Sarno and Taylor, 2001). From the 
early 2000s, however, central banks in the main industrialised countries withdrew from 
foreign exchange intervention. 
                                                 
10 http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_swaplines.htm 
11 Quotations from the 2013 G7 Ministers and Governors’ statement. 
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Central banks in emerging market economies have tended to intervene more in exchange 
markets to dampen volatility, curb speculation or to influence the level of exchange rate 
during the 2000s (Mohanty and Bat-el Berger, 2013; Menkhoff, 2013). In the wake of the 
2008 global financial crisis the priority of domestic economic stabilization resulted in rapid 
monetary expansion in the USA and other industrialized economies as they sought to avoid 
the deflationary spiral of the 1930s Great Depression. This introduced a new era of 
uncoordinated monetary policies and exchange rate instability that created negative 
externalities for many emerging market economies that have suffered from appreciating 
nominal exchange rates as the dollar depreciated. Because nominal exchange rate changes can 
affect domestic prices, central banks in emerging market economies have thus intervened in 
foreign exchange markets to support their inflation targeting. The asymmetric onus of 
adjustment between the USA and emerging market economies has in turn led to new calls for 
reform of the international monetary and financial architecture. 
Surveying the period since 1979, the international monetary regime has so far delivered the 
two public goods – international currencies and external stability – for most of the time, and 
central banks have contributed to international monetary stability, although the system has 
been quite heterogeneous and gone through different crises. The crucial variable has been the 
independence of central banks, which has enabled them to preserve price stability against the 
short-term interests of the government and to take extraordinary measures in times of crisis. 
The other variable, the degree of international policy convergence, seems to have been less 
relevant since 1979. There were times when the core nations pursued different policy goals, 
but the international monetary system was not threatened by this divergence, thanks to the 
floating exchange rate regimes in the core countries. Of course, our overall positive 
assessment of what central banks have achieved over the last few decades may be premature. 
At the time of writing, the negative consequences of the global financial crisis are still not 
digested. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This survey has discussed the question of how central banks in the core economies 
contributed to the stability of the international monetary system. Our hypothesis is that the 
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combination of three variables answers this question: the exchange rate system, the degree of 
international policy convergence, and the extent of central bank independence. Under a 
system of fixed exchange rates central banks can play a constructive role only when there is a 
high degree of international policy convergence, while central bank independence is 
secondary. By contrast, under a system of floating exchange rates central bank independence 
is the crucial variable, while the degree of international policy convergence is less important. 
We have traced the historical development from the 19th century when the management of 
national currencies emerged as an important policy instrument and central banks were 
required to operationalize the gold standard in most countries, which proved to be quite 
stable. The underlying reason was that from the 1870s to 1914 core countries adhered to the 
same liberal principles, and central bankers were able to use their room of maneuver in a 
constructive way thanks to this strong liberal consensus. Fixed exchange rates in the 20th 
century, however, were not sustainable due to the lack of common goals and interests. Central 
banks were not able to overcome the centrifugal political as well as economic forces in the 
1920s and the 1960s, even though they were independent in the first period and collaborated 
extensively in the latter one. 
Subsequently, the system of floating exchange rates in the 1970s proved unstable because 
most central banks, notably the Fed, the Bank of England and the Banque de France, were not 
independent. They were subject to short-term considerations of the cabinet, political parties 
and lobbying groups. In the late 1970s, following the German and Swiss example, 
governments began to free central banks from their political dependence. As a result, the 
international monetary system became much more stable. Since then, central banks have 
played a pivotal role in preserving the two public goods any international monetary regime is 
supposed to provide: international currencies and external stability – perhaps more than ever 
in history. Central banks also managed to prevent the system from collapsing during the 
severe financial crisis of 2007-9. They could draw on the range of operations to prop up the 
fixed exchange rate system deployed in the 1960s, such as bilateral swap network, with the 
BIS having an important role in bringing central bankers together to exchange views and 
information confidentially. In contrast to the 1930s, the international monetary order among 
core economies has not broken down, although the longer term extent and impact of spillover 
effects on emerging market economies remains unresolved. 
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Accordingly, praising or blaming central bankers for the functioning of the international 
monetary system misses the core fact that crucial levers were often outside their reach. While 
exercising some informal power through their responsibility for operationalizing the decisions 
of governments over the form of the international monetary system and occasionally 
influencing the decisions more directly, central banks have generally played a supportive 
rather than leading role. They have been able to exploit their particular characteristics, such as 
their technical expertise, their close links with the private sector and their ability to take agile 
and sometimes secretive action. In the end, however, politics and institutions decide whether 
or not central banks are able to play a constructive role. 
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